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Abstract—Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) has emerged as
an informtion-centric public key cryptographic system which
allows a data owner to share data, according to an access
policy, with multiple data users based on the attributes they
possess, without knowing their identities. In the original ABE
schemes, a central authority administrates the system and issues
secret keys to data users based on their attributes and both
the owner and users need to trust a specific CA. However, in
certain real-world applications, the data users would not trust
anyone but themselves. For such situations, we introduce a new
decentralization model of ABE, termed Data User-based ABE
(DU-ABE), which is managed jointly by the data users. DU-
ABE is the first decentralized ABE scheme which replaces the
authorities with the data users without employing any other extra
entities.
Index Terms—Attribute Based Encryption, ABE, CP-ABE,
Decentralization
I. INTRODUCTION
For Bob to communicate securely with Alice via public-
key encryption, he encrypts a message with Alice’s public
key (PK), which Alice decrypts with her secret (private) key
(SK). Here, Bob (a data owner or DO) knows that it is Alice
(a data user or DU) who he would like to communicate with.
However, there are situations where a DO would like to share
data securely with (multiple) DUs whose identities are not
known. For instance, the President of a university may want to
send encrypted data to all the Teacher or Research Assistants
in the CIS Department, but does not know the identities of all
these eligible students.
In 2005, Sahai and Waters [1] introduced Attribute-Based
Encryption (ABE) as the first one-to-many cryptosystem.
There are two kinds of ABE: ciphertext policy attribute-
based encryption (CP-ABE) and key policy attribute-based
encryption (KP-ABE). The first KP-ABE was proposed by
Goyal et al. in 2006 [2] and the first CP-ABE by Bethencourt
et al. in 2007 [3].
In CP-ABE, a DU receives its SK based on the attributes it
possesses. When the DO shares the data securely, the data is
encrypted with an access policy. For instance, the University
President could share data securely with the policy {“CIS De-
partment” & (“Teacher Assistant, ” || “Research Assistant”)}
so that students with either attribute {“CIS Department” &
“Teacher Assistant”} or {“CIS Department” & “Research
Assistant”} can decrypt the President’s ciphertext. In KP-ABE,
DUs’ SKs are generated based on an specific access policy.
Clearly, CP-ABE is more applicable to practical applications.
The original ABE systems employ a central authority (CA)
which issues SKs to DUs. Such a centralized architecture suf-
fers from several issues. Efforts [4]–[13] have been proposed
to decentralize ABE to address issues such as key escrow
[14], ineligible DUs [15], key exposure [16], forging signatures
[17], privacy of DUs [18], and flexibility [19]. The main idea
of decentralization lies in dividing the responsibilities of the
single CA among multiple authorities.
In both ABE and decentralized ABE (DABE), the
CA/authorities are assumed to work honestly so that all the
DOs and DUs are obligated to trust CA/authorities. However,
since there is no supervision of CA/authorities, there are situa-
tions where DUs would not trust CA or authorities. Therefore,
the existing DABE models are not capable of handling these
situations.
To address the problem of unwillingness to trust
CA/authorities, this paper proposes a new DABE scheme
termed data user-based ABE (or DU-ABE for short), where the
DUs are not obligated to trust CA/authorities. Instead, the DUs
themselves take over the responsibilities of CA/authorities. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first scheme where DUs
work as the authorities of an ABE system. Although, in several
efforts [18], [20], DUs cooperatively work with CA/authorities
to facilitate certain features, DUs do not have any role to issue
SKs to other DUs. In addition, these models employ both
CA/authorities and DUs to operate the system. In contrast,
DU-ABE completely removes any other entity except the DUs
themselves, so that all the activities are accomplishes by the
DUs.
The paper proceeds in Section II to review the needed
background knowledge. In Section III, the paper reviews the
issues raised by centralized ABE and then categorizes the
existing DABE schemes. Section IV first articulates a new
incentive to decentralise ABE and then describes the new
decentralised ABE model, DU-ABE. Section VI concludes the
paper with future work.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first briefly review some basic crypto-
graphic backgrounds, and then explain the concept of CP-ABE
which is adapted to develop our model.
A. Bilinear Maps
Consider G0 and G1 as two multiplicative cyclic groups, p
as the same prime order of both groups, and g as the generator
of G0. A map e : G0×G0 → G1, with an efficient algorithm
to compute e(g1, g2) for all g1, g2 ∈ G0. Then e is called
bilinear if it has the following two properties:
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1) Bilinearity: For all g1, g2 ∈ G0 and a, b ∈ Zp,
e(ga1 , g
b
2) = e(g1, g2)
ab.
2) Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1.
B. Review of CP-ABE
As CP-ABE is more applicable to real-world applications
than KP-ABE, most of the research has been done to improve
CP-ABE. The first applicable CA-ABE scheme was proposed
by Bethencourt et al. [3] which was then improved by Waters
[21] to provide a more efficient scheme. The two models from
these two papers are the basic schemes which are used in
subsequent papers. Both of these two models consist of the
following four algorithms.
Setup: The CA runs the Setup algorithm by choosing some
security parameters and an attribute universe description to
generate a PK and a master key (MK). Then, the PK is
broadcast and known by every entity in the system, while the
MK is known only to the CA. The CA needs the MK to issue
SKs to different DUs.
KeyGen: Each DU who wants to decrypt ciphertexts should
send a request to the CA to receive the SKs related to DU’s
attributes. While the CA knows the MK, it can issue the SKs
for any legitimate DUs based on DU’s attributes by running
the KeyGen algorithm.
Encrypt: The DO runs this algorithm to encrypt its data
by using the PK. It also needs to determine a specific access
policy to decide which DUs should be able to decrypt the
ciphertext. Then, the DO shares the ciphertext with the DUs.
Decrypt: The DU receives the ciphertext and decrypts the it
by only if he/she possesses enough attributes which are needed
based on the mentioned access policy by the DO. The Decrypt
algorithm returns an Error when a DU does not possess enough
attributes.
III. REVIEW OF EXISTING DABE MODELS
In this section, we first review some of the issues that
incentivize the decentralization of ABE (into DABE). We then
classify existing DABE models into two categories.
A. Issues with Centralized ABE
In the original CP-ABE models, there is one CA managing
the entire system. Such centralized architectures raise the
following issues.
1) Key escrow: In centralized ABE, since CA has the
MK of the entire system, a ‘curious’ CA might generate
SKs related to all the attributes for itself and decrypt all the
ciphertexts [14]. However, DOs only want to share their data
with legitimate DUs, not the ‘curious’ CA. To address this
issue, efforts of [4], [22] divided the responsibilities of the
CA (of centralized ABE) among multiple authorities so that
each authority generates its own MK. To issue an SK, all
the authorities should cooperate with each other so that each
authority generates one component of the SK from its MK.
A DU can form its SK by ‘combining’ all the components
of SKs received from authorities. Therefore, as long as the
authorities do not collude each other by sharing their MKs
with each other, none of the authorities can issue a SK for
itself.
2) Ineligible DUs: DOs are obligated to trust the CA and
assume that the CA will authenticate the eligible DUs honestly.
However, as the CA is not supervised in centralized ABE,
the CA might take advantage of its power and issue SKs to
ineligible DUs [15]. Decentralization mitigates this issue since
a (decentralized) authority cannot generate SKs alone as it has
to cooperate with other authorities to issue SKs.
3) Key exposure: After running the Setup algorithm and
generating the MK, the CA needs to save the MK securely. In
practice, an attacker might circumvent the security of CA and
steal its MK [16], so that the entire system is compromised.
In DABE, the issue of key exposure is mitigated by each
authorities having its own MK. An adversary will not be
successful until stealing the MK from all the authorities, which
is much more complicated.
4) Forging signatures: In centralized ABE, after generating
SKs, the CA can save a copy of the SKs to forge the signatures
of the DUs who use these SKs as signatures [17]. In the DABE
schemes of [9], [22], [23], since the final SK is generated by
multiple authorities, none of the authorities has the final SK
to forge the signature of a DU.
5) Privacy of DUs: Privacy becomes a concern when the
CA uses the attributes of a DU to generate the SK. Song
et al. [18] proposed a DABE scheme which consists of
the authorities of attribute auditing center (AAC) and key
generation center (KGC). DU authenticates itself to AAC to
receive a ‘blind token’ which is presented to KGC to generate
the SK. In this case, the model preserves privacy as AAC does
not know anything about the SK and KGC does not know
anything about the attributes of the DU.
6) Flexibility: Centralized ABE is not scalable to scenarios
where organizations want to share data according to a policy
written over attributes issued across different trust domains.
Lewko et al. [19] proposed an scalable multi-authority ABE
scheme in which a DO can encrypt data for a policy written
over attributes issued by different authorities.
B. Classification of the Existing DABE Schemes
The DABE schemes described above can be broadly clas-
sified into the following two categories.
1) Authority-level decentralization: One obvious approach
to decentralizing ABE is to divide the responsibilities of the
CA among authorities, so that each of the authorities has its
own MK and authorities cooperatively issue an SK to each
DU. Hur et al. [4] employed two authorities where they run
a secure two-party computation protocol to issue SK to DUs
without revealing their MKs to each other. While the scheme in
[4] is based on the Bethencourt model [3], Li et al. [9], based
on the Waters model [21], developed a similar decentralization
scheme with two authorities. In addition, Li et al. [9] proposed
a DABE scheme in which a threshold t out of n authorities
are needed to collaborate with each other and issue SK to a
DU.
In contrast, Lewko et al. [19] delegated the responsibility
of generating the part of SK for each attribute (or a set of
attributes) to one authority, so that authorities do not need to
cooperate with one other to generate the final SK.
2) DO-level decentralization: Bozovic et al. [14] developed
a model in which a DO cooperate with multiple authorities
to operate a DABE system by explicitly defining the list of
recipients who can decrypt the ciphertext. In addition, Sandor
et al. [24] proposed a model in which multiple authorities
cooperate with DO during the key generation phase. In this
model, it is supposed that DO has a local list of DUs and can
authenticate these DUs. Then DO and each of the authorities
together issue one part of SK to DU. The final SK is a
combination of all the different parts of SK.
Although DO-level decentralization can mitigate some of
the issues incurred by centralized ABE, DOs need to know the
set of recipients to issue SK parts to them. This assumption is
in contrast to the original motivation of ABE in which DOs
do not know the DUs in advance.
IV. DATA USER-BASED ABE (DU-ABE)
The previous DABE schemes have been developed to mit-
igate the above mentioned issues associated with centralized
ABE schemes. In this section, we describe a new incentive
which prompts the development of a new decentralization
model of ABE.
A. New Incentive for Decentralization
We use the following example to motivate the new model.
In a country where members of the House of Representatives
form different committees to makes the nation’s laws, each
member possesses different attributes, such as member of
the “House of Representatives”, member of the “Agriculture
committee,” member of the “Budget committee,” and so on. By
using ABE, a citizen (i.e., a DO) can share private information
with the intended members (i.e., DUs) according to his/her
access policy.
Typically, members of the House of Representatives are
either affiliated with different parties or independent. To use
a centralized ABE system, all the members of the House of
Representative are obligated to agree on a CA. The question
is who could be the CA. One simple option is that all the
members trust the Speaker to become the CA who operates a
centralized ABE system to issues SKs to members. However,
the issue is that the Speaker is probably from the majority
party who will not be trusted by either the members of the
other parties or independent. In such a scenario, issues of key
escrow, ineligible DUs, key exposure, and forging signature
described above will arise.
The other option is to have a subset of members as au-
thorities to run a DABE system, where all the members need
to trust the authorities and assume that the authorities will
not collude with each other. However, there are independent
members who will not trust any authorities.
To address this issue, we introduce DU-ABE which is
designed to handle such a situation. In DU-ABE, all the DUs
possess attributes, and run a DU-ABE system cooperatively
to issue SKs to themselves. Members of a specific committee,
each having his/her own MK, issue SKs to one another.
Therefore, in DU-ABE, all the DUs are authorities themselves
where they do not need to trust one another.
B. Model of DU-ABE
In DU-ABE, all the DUs together have the full control of the
cryptosystem, where DUs generate and save their respective
MKs. Cooperatively, they issue SKs to themselves without
leaking their respective MKs to one another. DU-ABE consists
of the following five algorithms:
Global Setup (λ)→ GP
All the DUs need to communicate with one another to agree
upon the security parameters (λ) as the input to the Global
Setup algorithm which outputs the global parameters (GP) for
the system.
Authority Setup (GP) → MK, PK
Every group of DUs who possess the same attribute run the
Authority Setup algorithm together, which inputs the GP of the
system and outputs both an MK and a PK for that attribute
for each DU. The DUs of different groups broadcast the PKs
but save the MKs securely. So, the system has a distinct MK
and PK per attribute for each DU.
Encryption (M, (A, ρ), GP, {PK}) → CT
A DO runs the encryption algorithm which inputs a message
M , an access matrix (A, ρ), which is generated based on the
access policy, the GP of the system, and also the set of PKs
of the relevant set of attributes specified in access matrix. The
encryption algorithm outputs a ciphertext (CT), which only a
DU who possesses the specified attributes, can decrypt the CT
and retrieve the message M .
KeyGen (GID, GP, MK) → SK
When a specific DU wants to obtain an SK related to one
attribute, it needs to communicate with all the other DUs who
have the same attribute. This DU is one of the DUs who are
the authorities of this attribute. Then, these DUs run the key
generation algorithm which takes GID as an identity for the
DU, i related to the attribute, general parameter (GP) and MK
of the DUs, and outputs the SK to the legitimate DU.
Decrypt (CT, GP, SK) →M
A DU needs to run the decryption algorithm to decrypt
the ciphertext CT. Th decryption algorithm takes CT, global
parameter (GP), and secret key SK related to a DU with its
specific GID. If the DU possesses enough attributes, it can
decrypt the CT to access the message M .
C. Construction of DU-ABE
We develop DU-ABE based on the Lewko model [19] based
on the following algorithm.
Global Setup (λ)→ GP
In the global setup algorithm, all the DUs agree on a bilinear
group G of order N = p1p2p3, a production of three prime
numbers, and a generator g1 of Gp1. In addition, DUs choose
a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ −→ G that maps GID of DUs to
elements of G. Then, GP = {g1, H} is published.
Authority Setup (GP) → PK, MK
We suppose that each attribute i is managed by a group
of ni DUs who possess attribute i. Each DUi,j , as the jth
data user who possesses attribute i, should choose two random
exponents αi,j , βi,j ∈ ZN and keep MKi,j = {αi,j , βi,j} as
its master key. Then DUi,j publishes its public key PKi,j =
{e(g1, g1)αi,j , gβi,j1 }. The PK of attribute i (PKi) can be
generated by multiplying the PKs of all ni DUs who manage
attribute i as follows:
PKi =
∏ni
k=1 PKi,k = {e(g1, g1)
∑ni
k=1 αi,k , g
∑ni
k=1 βi,k
1 }
KeyGen (GID, GP, {MKi,j}) → SKi,GID
When a DU with a specific GID wants to receive its secret
key SKi,GID for attribute i, it should send a request to the
other ni − 1 DUs who possess attribute i. Each of ni DUs
issue g1αi,jH(GID)βi,j to the requesting DU and the final
SKi,GID is as follows.
SKi,GID=
∏ni
k=1 g1
αi,kH(GID)βi,k
As the public parameters, the public keys, and the final
generated are the same as those of the Lewko model [19],
both encryption and decryption algorithms remain the same.
Fig. 1. An DU-ABE Example
For instance, Fig. 1 depicts a simplified example of a House
of Representatives, where all the members possess attribute
“House of Representatives,” and some of them possess at-
tributes “agriculture” or “Budget.” First, all the members need
to agree on security parameters λ and run the Global Setup
algorithm. Then all the members run the Authority Setup
algorithm for attribute “House of Representatives,” and each
member chooses an MK and publishes a PK for this attribute.
Afterward, all the members issue a part of SK to one another
for this attribute.
For attribute “Budget,” only four members run the Authority
Setup algorithm and choose MK and publish PK. Then these
four members issue parts of SK to one another. The same ac-
tivities for attribute “Agriculture.” Using encryption algorithm,
a DU such as the Secretary of the Treasury, can encrpt data
with access policy “House of Representatives” & “Budget” so
that only the member of the House of Representatives who
are also members in the Budget committee can decrypt the
ciphertext.
V. ANALYSES OF DU-ABE
A. Security
DUs might collude with each other by combining their SKs
to decrypt a ciphertext, which otherwise cannot be decrypted
by using individual SK. DU-ABE is secure against this kind
of collusion attack, since the issued SKs are related to specific
GIDs for different DUs. Therefore, a combined SK with
different GIDs could not be used for decryption.
In DU-ABE, as long as at least one DU works trustworthy,
the system would be secure. Therefore, each DU need to think
about himself and work honestly. If a DU does not collude
with other DUs, he/she could be sure that other DUs cannot
issue a SK and launch key escrow nor ineligible DU attacks.
B. Limitations
In contrast to all the other ABE and DABE systems, in DU-
ABE, the DUs need to know each other before bootstrapping
the system, as DUs collaboratively accomplish all the func-
tions.
In addition, all the DUs need to communicate with one
another to issue SKs to each DU. Although this incurs high
communication overhead, this key generation phase occurs
only once when the system boots up.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced the concept of Data Users-
based ABE (DU-ABE) as a new decentralized ABE model. As
discussed, in situations where the DUs cannot trust each other
or any other authorities, they bootstrap a DU-ABE system to
manage the entire system by themselves. In the future work,
we plan to add features, such as revocation to accommodate
dynamic membership, and formally prove the security of DU-
ABE.
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